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Although euro area-wide inflation was from 1999 to 2005 almost right, i.e. “close to balance, 
but below 2%”,  and although it combined with real growth as predicted by the long-run 
money demand equation in the euro area, the picture that emerges at country level is more 
scattered. Inside a monetary union, inflation divergences could be destabilizing and an 
excessive dispersion could be a problem, thus the scattered performance of the single members 
in terms of HICP inflation and real growth is an issue that the euro area governance is ill-
prepared to manage. It may be of interest, therefore, to understand whether observed 
differences come from the money market  or from the costs side or from the interaction 
between supply and demand when agents are forward looking. The paper sets out to ascertain 
whether the patterns of inflation and growth data observed in the twelve members and 
Slovenia compare to what is predicted by the long-run money demand equation in the euro 
area, the Balassa-Samuelson construct or the New Keynesian model. 
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1.  Two types of macroeconomic stability  
 
Macroeconomic stability is traditionally defined as the combination 
of stable consumption prices and a sustainable public borrowing position, 
with real output close to potential output, but it has often been argued that 
the concept of stability should encompass other dimensions: e.g. stable asset 
prices and a sustainable private borrowing position. In a monetary union 
such as EMU, in particular, stability should also be given a geographical 
dimension as stability requires convergence in inflation in member and 
accession countries. Macroeconomic stability is held to be a precondition 
for long term growth and also one of the main achievements of the EU in 
the pre-EMU phase. It is useful to understand whether EMU has been and 
will be able to deliver. As real growth is uneven across space, particularly in 
the euro zone and the enlarged EU, it is crucial to understand in which ways 
growth disparities feed inflation disparities.  
 
In this paper we look at inflation and growth differentials in the euro 
zone from 1997 to 2005 and try to understand what available theories are 
able to account for the patterns in which inflation and growth combine in the 
euro zone countries.  Section 2. focuses on the achievements of the euro 
zone as such, year-by-year, and of the single countries, on average. Section 
3 focuses on the consequences of inflation disparities. Sections 4, 5 and 6 
focus on the available theories and find that they offer different predictions 
about the relation between growth and inflation in the short run. The final 
section focuses on the differences across countries year-by-year and 
speculates about which theories are able to match the available evidence for 
the euro zone. 
 
2.  The achievements  since 1999 
 
The euro zone economy is managed with a common monetary policy 
and weekly coordinated national fiscal policies. A  further characteristic 
feature of EMU is that while the decision making at the European Central 
Bank is based on an eclectic combination of economic and monetary 
analyses
1, rather than on any known explicit rule (Papademos, 2006), the 
eleven national governments and their fiscal policies are subject to a strict 
rule (the Stability and Growth pact). It is also well known that while urging 
the EU Council of Economy and Finance Ministers to watch the actions of 
national governments, the ECB refuses to adhere to any explicit and known 
rule in its conduct. Since the introduction of the euro in 1999, the single 
                                                 
1 Also known as the two pillars. member countries have not made concrete progress in the consolidation of 
public finances, and after the difficulties in the budget of the larger countries 
in the euro zone and the debate about the usefulness of the Stability pact 
they agreed to revise it in 2005. The new pact emphasizes the importance of 
total debt relative to that of net debt, but its enforcement appears to be softer 
than before. The ECB has interpreted the move as weakened fiscal 
discipline.  While the ECB, which took control of the common monetary 
policy in 1999 has only been able to keep the inflation rate close to – but 
above – the target level from 2000 on (see Fig 1), it has done so by adopting 
a policy which has often been accused of being unduly rigid
2.  
 
   When we come to the country level (Fig 2), we observe that average 
inflation rates
3 are quite different: the most virtuous country is Germany 
(1.34%) while the least virtuous is Greece (3.6%), in the period 1997 - 2005. 
There are five countries which had an average inflation rate below the 2% 
limit: Germany 1.34%, Austria 1,54%, France 1.61%, Belgium 1.79% and 
Finland 1,51%. Finland apart, these countries not only were in the ERM
4 
from the beginning (1979), but were also able to keep their currencies inside 
the narrow ±2.25 per cent band.  Four EMU members (i.e. Portugal 2.79%, 
Spain 2.82%, Ireland 3.16% and Greece 3.6%) had an average inflation rate 
above 2.5 per cent. Ireland excluded, the remaining three were latecomers in 
the ERM and had ±6 per cent, i.e. large bands. The three remaining 
countries (Italy 2.27%, Luxembourg 2.36% and Netherlands 2.46%) have 
inflation rates between 2 and 2.5 per cent. All three were in the ERM from 
the start, but Italy left for a while after the 1992 crisis and for most of the 
time was in the large of ±6 per cent band. The differences in EMU
5 clearly 
reflect those experienced when the countries were in the ERM as if 
admission to the euro zone were ineffective. Even if one can acknowledge a 
certain degree of ability in delivering inflation convergence to the two 
systems, the ECB still has to face up to an unfinished job.  
                                                 
2 It well known that macroeconomic stabilization in the euro zone not only lacks co-
operation, but faces policy conflicts; see: Buti, Roeger  and In’t Veld (2001). 
3 We have used annual average rate of changes in HICP, harmonized indexes of consumer 
prices, which are used by the ECB for monitoring  inflation in the EMU. See: 
http://epp.eurostat/.ec.europa.ec.  
4 The exchange rate mechanism (ERM) was the centrepiece of the European Monetary 
System which aimed to reduce exchange rate fluctuations and deliver monetary stability 
through a system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates.  
5 Busetti et al. (2006) arrived at the same results by applying unit root and stationarity tests 
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It is also interesting to consider real growth
6. The dispersion in real 
growth rates is clearly higher than that in inflation rates.  In terms of average 
rates in the euro zone and during the whole period 1997-2005, however, real 
growth is very close to inflation. Fig. 2 shows that the euro zone as such is 
close to 2 per cent inflation and 2 per cent real growth (actually 1.92 per 
cent inflation and 2.13 per cent growth). But if we stick to the period 
starting 1999, inflation is 2.04 per cent and growth 1.99 per cent.  Fig 2 
offers the basis for the central point dealt with in this paper, namely the 
                                                 
6 See: http://epp.eurostat/.ec.europa.ec. combined performance in terms of inflation and growth and the relation 
between the two indicators. From 1997 to 2005, growth rates in the euro 
zone ranged from 1.33% to 7.33% while inflation rates spanned the 1.34% - 
3.6% range. The figures in Fig. 2 beg for an explanation, and the ascending 
straight line clearly offers a possible one.  New Keynesian theory offers a 
well-known explanation for the positive relation between real growth and 
inflation as it posits that, in the short run and with a given expected inflation 
rate, an increase in output growth implies an higher rate of increase in costs 
and prices – a prediction that seems to fit the statistical evidence as 
summarized by the ascending line in Fig. 2. By regressing average inflation 
rates on average growth rates, we get: g p 24 . 0 5 . 1 + = , i.e. the ascending 
straight line. 
 
  This is not the whole story, however, as the analysis should be 
carried out at national level because the relation between output and prices 
offered by any New-Keynesian theory must reflect the intrinsic 
characteristics of markets in the national economy. EMU still seems to be a 
composite economic system to be analysed as a single economic system in a 
New Keynesian framework. There are, furthermore, other theories regarding 
the relation between growth and inflation that are worth considering.  Take 
the horizontal line drawn at 2 per cent in Fig. 2. The line is the upper limit 
for inflation and thus represents not only the ECB target rate for the euro 
zone, but something that it assumes to be feasible in theory and in practice. 
This is why the limit can also be considered the virtual target for the 
inflation rate in single countries. Although the ECB does consider the 
inflation rates in single countries as something it cannot and should not 
target directly, it should be made feasible by national adjustment 
mechanisms. Furthermore, when differences in inflation rates are persistent 
and large, the ECB cannot be confident about its ability to deliver the proper 
policy everywhere in the euro zone. Inflation convergence, indeed, was – 
and still is – one of the convergence criteria for membership of EMU and 
would be difficult to accept the ECB as being unable to keep on the same 
track as the single national central banks were able to do before becoming 
members. As there are other different theories concerning the relation 
between real growth and inflation, we must address the question in a more 
systematic way from both the economic and empirical points of view and in 
the next paragraph we start by summarizing the other, more compelling, 
arguments that make inflation differences a problem for the monetary union. 
 
 
3.  The consequences of inflation disparities 
 
Between real output and inflation there is a circular relation and 
nobody questions the assumption that in the long run growth is negatively 
affected by the average rate of inflation as high inflation impairs the proper working of the price mechanism
7 (Barro, 1996). From this point of view, it 
pays to adhere to an exchange rate mechanism such as the ERM or to a 
monetary union like EMU if it helps to reduce exchange rate fluctuations 
and inflation. In the short run, however, the relation between growth and 
inflation is more complex, particularly in a monetary union. Asymmetric 
shocks, differences in the economic structure of the different economies, 
lack of convergence between countries, or plain mismanagement are 
problems in a monetary union. The common monetary policy, which above 
was assumed to deliver advantages to members, could become destabilizing 
which is a particularly serious problem if there is not enough room for fiscal 
policy stabilization.  
 
To look into the relation between growth and inflation it is helpful to 
make a distinction between the relationship going from real output to 
inflation and that going in the opposite direction. As for the latter, there are 
three basic mechanisms at work. The first deals with the real interest rate, 
the second  goes through the real exchange rate, while the third involves the 
level of real wages. In a monetary union, these mechanisms deal with the 
implications of the common monetary policy on the performance of the real 
economy in the single member countries
8.  
 
As there are differences in the harmonized inflation rates across 
EMU, it is hardly surprising that consensus forecasts regularly show that 
expectations about inflation are also different. As the real interest rate in a 
particular country is the difference between the common short-term interest 
rate and the expected inflation rate in the same country: 
e
i p i−  different 
expectations bear differently upon real interest rates across EMU. A country 
whose domestic inflation rate is permanently above the average, 0 > − p pi , 
will enjoy a lower than average real interest rate because the expected 
domestic inflation rate will be higher than the average:   0 > −
e e
i p p , 
notwithstanding the ECB target rate and its assessment of the area-wide 
expected inflation rate. Therefore, the difference 
e e
i p i p i − < −  fuels real 
demand where demand and inflation are higher than the average. 
 
With a permanently high inflation rate, a country is normally less 
competitive and its net demand will be lower. The third mechanism works 
through real wages and has two distinct components. On one side, a higher 
inflation rate helps stabilization as it lowers real wages, thus reducing the 
impact of nominal rigidities. But, on the other side, there are the effects on 
                                                 
7 Barro (1996), for instance, has verified that this is true in a large sample of countries for 
the period going from 1960 to 1990.   
8 The inflation gap is the difference between the inflation rate in country i  and the euro 
zone rate as : p pi −  and the output gap is the difference between the effective real growth 
rate and potential real growth rate by:  i i g g − .  
 income distribution and thus on demand: lower income to workers would 
imply lower internal demand, but it could end up by boosting profits. The 
equity market could benefit, thus producing a wealth effect on consumption 
as well as having a positive effect on investment.   
 
Furthermore, as real demand in larger economies is normally less 
dependent on foreign demand than is the case in smaller ones, the real 
interest and the real wage effects  are likely to dominate the exchange rate 
effect in the larger economies and vice versa. The net result of inflation 
differentials on real demand clearly depends on the balance between the 
many different effects just mentioned and is thus a question which deserves 
an empirical test in each country.  
 
All in all, there is a possibility that the ECB’s monetary policy will 
end up not only delivering different stimuli to different member countries, 
but also permanently destabilizing effects from the demand side, if the 
differences in inflation are permanent and certain conditions are satisfied. 
This is worrying because the coordination between the different countries, 
the Commission and the ECB will be further impaired.  
 
 
   
 
4.  Inflation disparities in the New Keynesian model  
 
 Economic theory is much more uncertain about the link going from 
real demand towards inflation. There are basically three theories, offering 
very different predictions about the relation between real growth and 
inflation: the Keynesian theory, the monetarist construct and  the structural 
model.  The first, and perhaps the more general theory is what is now called 
the New Keynesian one, which considers both demand and supply and 
makes the inflation rate and the output gap mutually dependent when agents 
are forward looking. The monetarist model focuses only on money and real 
demand; the structural model deals only with the supply side.  
 
Although it is a general equilibrium model of the economy with 
nominal rigidities as in the traditional Keynesian model, the New Keynesian 
model distinctly assumes that agents and the central bank are forward-
looking. It is the role of expectations and the presence of a monetary rule for 
the central bank, instead of the traditional money demand equation,  that 
qualifies it as new
9. The model dates back to the late Nineties (see e.g. : 
Clarida, Gali, Gertler, 1999) and in the literature it comes in different 
versions  depending on whether the economy adjusts to current expectations 
of future inflation or past expectations of current inflation. The demand 
equation links the absolute level of the output gap to the real interest rate, 
the supply equation – basically an inflation-augmented Phillips curve, 
                                                 
9 The more sophisticated formulations of this model encompass micro-foundations.  determines the inflation rate and a Taylor monetary rule determines the 
nominal interest rate.  
 
Although in the basic version of the theory (Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler, 1999) the economy is closed, it is useful to refer to the recent 
application by Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004)
10 of such a model to the 
twelve open economies of the euro area. In the euro area there should 
ideally be twelve pairs of demand and supply equations plus one monetary 
rule, but because of the paucity of available data (they range from 1998:1 to 
2003:1) AE were obliged to reduce the number of equations and parameters. 
Their
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There are four demand equations, each one determining the output 
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 The model is closed by the money rule, which basically relates the 
interest rate to area-wide expected inflation and average output gap, namely: 
 
] ) 02 . 0 ( )[ 1 ( 1 t y
e
k t p t t gap p r r ϕ ϕ ρ ρ + − − + = + −  ,      (3) 
5 . 1 = p ϕ , 




t p t p r 1 + =ϕ .          (4) 
The assumed area-wide output gap ( t gap ) obviously misrepresents the 
variety of country specific gaps which are likely to be present when the 
business cycles are not synchronized or when the shocks are asymmetrical. 
The ECB has always said that such a rule by no means represents its own 
strategy of intervention, even though its decisions obviously take inflation 
expectations into account. The ECB’s own assessment of inflation 
expectations is anchored to the gap between the effective real money 
demand and long-run real money demand
12 in the euro zone and other 
                                                 
10 In what follows, Angeloni and Ehrmann will be briefly indicated with AE.  
11 The estimates are those of  Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004).  
12 It is the so-called “monetary overhang”, defined as the liquidity not accounted for by the 
cyclical state of the economy in terms of real demand and interest rates (ECB, 2004). See: 
http://ecb.int/pub/. 
 variables, and its decisions on interest rates appear to be based on an 
eclectic analysis of the situation.  However, some formal rule is always 
present in New Keynesian models not only because a formal rule is 
manageable, but also because some rules have proved to be able to track the 
profile of official interest rates. The money rule above is most often reduced 
to the simpler formulation: 
e
t p t p r 1 + =ϕ   (equation 4).
 . This formulation 
implies a quick reaction to changes in expectations ( 0 = ρ ), and gives the 
parameter
  p ϕ  a
 critical role. The Authors’ findings indicate that when this 
parameter increases, the inflation rate deviates less from its long-term level 
and inflation differences are lower.  
 
The supply equation assumes the current rate of inflation in each 
country, it p , as positively related to the level of real activity, i.e. the absolute 
output gap, and to the nominal effective exchange rate ( it neer ). It further 
assumes the current inflation rate to be proportional to both the lagged 
inflation rate and the current expected inflation rate.  When the lagged 
inflation rate parameter,  1 α , is high, there is inflation persistence as  agents 
react less to current expectations of future inflation. When the output gap 
parameter  β  is low, we say that there is rigidity in the markets as the 
inflation rate is moderately affected by the level of the output gap. The 
estimates show both persistence and rigidity  087 , 0 ; 461 , 0 1 = = β α  in the 
euro zone. The Authors’ obvious conclusion is that inflation persistence is 
the factor propagating inflation differences, but the basic point appears to 
have been missed: why is inflation different across countries, if the 
monetary policy is the same?   
 
It is easier to grasp the mechanics of the New Keynesian model if we 
use the schoolbook graphic representation of Fig. 3
13 where the output gap 
in country i ( i i g g − , with  i g  as potential growth) is assumed to be positive. 
The supply line has a positive slope in Fig. 3, Panel A, while the demand 
curve can be represented as the descending line in Fig. 3, Panel B. In their 
model for the euro area, AE assume that there are differences in the slope 
coefficients of the demand curve, thus admitting that monetary stimuli are 
passed differently across the different member countries, but they assume 
that there are no differences in the supply side. In particular, while there are 
no differences in the pass-through of import costs onto inflation (γ ), the 
Authors discriminate between countries as far as openness to trade is 
concerned. The monetary rule (equation 3), which calls for an increase in 
the nominal interest rate ( t r ) when the area-wide expected inflation rate 
(
e
it p 1 + ) increases and when the area-wide output gap increases, appears as an 
ascending line in Fig. 3, Panel B. Consider now the case of an adverse and 
symmetric supply shock ( 0 1 > it ε , everywhere). The shock shifts the supply 
schedule upwards in Fig. 3, thus yielding an increase in the inflation rate at 
                                                 
13 Fig. 3 represents a general case, not the AE model. the initial output gap in country i. To understand why the symmetric shock 
could lead to asymmetric effects, we must consider a few points. As agents 
are forward-looking, they duly foresee higher prices, a fact which pushes the 
supply curve further up, but not necessarily by the same amount everywhere 
because they correctly anticipate the domestic price increase; indeed, the 
theory behind the supply equation (1) makes supply a decreasing function of 
the expected domestic inflation rate
e
it p 1 +
14. To figure out the change in 
expectations
e
it p 1 +  in countryi, one must ideally solve the model thus taking 
into account two other separate effects. 
 
As regards the demand side, there will be an increase in the nominal 
interest rate which is proportional to the area-wide change in the expected 
inflation rate. The ascending straight line in Panel B, representing the rule, 
shifts upwards by (
e
t p p 1 ) 1 ( + Δ − ϕ ρ ) in equation (3). A change in the real 
interest rate then follows as the result of the combined increase in the 
nominal interest rate (
e
t p p 1 ) 1 ( + Δ − ϕ ρ , in equation (4)) and the increase in the 




t p p p ϕ ρ . The 
increase in the real interest rate and the resulting appreciation usually 
shrinks real demand and squeezes output thus reducing the output gap. The 
final outcome for one particular country of the adverse common supply 
shock, is represented in Fig. 3 as a higher inflation rate, a higher interest rate 
and a lower output gap.  
 
In the case of a monetary union such as the one considered by AE, it 
is key to understand that while the shift in the monetary rule schedule is the 
                                                 
14 When the current inflation rate  it p is given in equation (1).  
it p Δ
it gap Δ
Fig. 3 – A supply shock according the New Keynesian 
Panel A 
Panel B 
Supply in country i 
Common monetary rule  
Demand in country i 
t r Δsame everywhere, the effect on real interest rates and the resulting shift in 
the demand curves are not the same across space. The final effect on the 
output gap and the inflation rate therefore cannot be the same everywhere  
 
The crucial feature of a multi-country New Keynesian model such as 
that of AE is that the changes in the expected and actual inflation rates (the 
response profile) are the same in each single country. These differences 
reflect the limited capacity of the central bank to anchor equally the 
expected inflation rates across the euro zone, but also the differences 
existing in the euro zone in the demand and supply equations. Indeed, if 
agents do not always behave rationally, they can be credited with being able 
to consider their own country’s inflation rate history and prospects, not the 
area-wide average, as is the case for the ECB. A first potential source of 
inflation divergence then is the unequal transmission of monetary stimuli 
across the different countries, as yielded by the parameters i δ , in the AE 
model. Integration in European monetary and capital markets is still not 
perfect, which means that, in a particular country, the perceived real interest 
rate is different from elsewhere. Furthermore, there are still differences 
across countries in the degree of persistence. AE assume uniform inflation 
persistence ( 461 , 0 1 = α ) and the rigidity (β ) across space, but differences 
in the degree of persistence and rigidity are nevertheless likely to be 
important in the euro zone. Finally, the effects of monetary policy which are 
mediated by the nominal exchange rate of the euro are not the same across 
the European countries.  In conclusion, the changes in the inflation rate and 
the output gap are different, although the interest rate changes by the same 




5.  The money demand equation 
 
A second way of looking at inflation and growth is based on the 
aggregate money demand equation. Although the money demand equation 
can be ascribed to Keynes, it is also compatible with the monetary tradition 
in that it focuses on the quantity of money made available to agents and the 
amount they are willing to hold in their portfolios (Friedman, 1970, Brand 
and Cassola, 2004). What interests us here is that, according to this theory, 
changes in the level of real output drive changes in the level of prices, given 
the amount of available liquidity and its circulation velocity. In this case, the 
relation between the rate of real growth and the rate of inflation is inverse, 
which means that there  is a possibility that a single monetary policy 
combined with permanent disparities in the rate of growth could be a source 
of inflation differentials per se, particularly if the euro money market fails to 
integrate perfectly. This theory offers a way of interpreting the observed 
differences in inflation across the euro area which is different from that 
purported by the New Keynesian theory.  
 Consider the current money demand in the euro zone.  Conventional 
money demand models assume that real GDP, interest rates and the price 
level are the determinants of the money that agents want in their portfolios 
and the recent estimates of the euro-wide money demand equation are no 
exception.  Bruggeman et al., 2003 and Brand – Cassola, 2004, and ECB, 
2004, for instance, estimate that a stable long-run demand equation for the 
whole euro area, such as:  
 
t t t i y k m β α − + =         ( 5 )  
  
exists; where:  t m  and t y are logarithms of the real stock of broad money and 
real GDP, respectively.  k is a constant, and  t i is the spread between the 
market interest rate and the rate of return of the money itself, i.e. the 
opportunity cost of holding liquidity. In the different estimates, it turns out 
that the elasticity of GDP is always close to  3 . 1 , i.e.  3 . 1 = α . The estimate 
of the other parameter is significant, but changes according to the market 
interest rate used to define the spread. As a matter of fact, it is   
8 . 0 8 . 1 − ≤ ≤ − β , and in what follows we will assume that  3 . 1 = β   The 
European Central Bank apparently manages to offer the euro system the 
right quantity of liquidity in the whole euro area and keep the short term 
interest rate at the right level. In doing this, it apparently uses, among other 
things, excess liquidity measures derived from an equation of the type 
described above, on an aggregate basis. When there are permanent growth 
disparities inside the euro area and the money market is not perfectly 
integrated, the aggregate excess liquidity measure cannot signal differences 
stemming from them, but merely an average difference, and the common 
monetary policy may lead to inflation disparities across space. This can 
easily be seen by differentiating the demand equation with respect to time 
and using the resulting equation to translate the relevant real growth rate 
into an inflation rate. Let  i g and  i p indicate, as usual, the real growth and 
the inflation rates in country i. As the long-term rate of growth of the money 
stock is  045 . 0 = t m &  (Brand and Cassola, 2004), the equation in terms of 
percentage rates of changes corresponding to the one defined above is:  
 
i i g p 3 . 1 045 , 0 − = ,            ( 6 )  
 
as it is sensible to assume the spread as a constant, at least in the long run.  
 
Thus, by using this equation, one focuses on the demand side of the 
economy as the variable driving the inflation rate is real output only. As the 
ECB assumes that the euro zone has its own single demand equation and the 
countries do not have one any longer, it is possible to assume that there is 
only one common inverse relation between the two.  Fig. 2 shows the long-
run money demand locus which, according to the ECB, holds good in the 
euro zone. It predicts that when the money stock grows steadily at 4.5 per 
cent a year, the average inflation rate in the euro zone is a mere 1.9 per cent, if the real growth rate is also constant at 2 per cent. As is obvious, an 
increase in money growth will yield higher inflation, all things being equal. 
If that relationship between growth and inflation holds good not only for the 
euro zone as a whole, but also for the single countries, one could say that 
slow-growing countries would experience inflation rates higher than the 
average while fast-growing ones would experience inflation rates that are 
lower than the average, in the long run. But will this happen?  According to 
this theory, the answer will depend on the functioning of the money market. 
In the wholesale money market, the ECB system supplies liquidity to the 
banks and to the inter-bank market in the euro zone, while in the national 
retail markets, households and non-bank institutions apply to local banks. 
The pattern of inflation rates across the euro zone depends on how this dual 
market is able to channel liquidity and, thus, on its degree of integration. 
The target of a flat 2 per cent inflation rate both in slow growers and fast 
growers can be reached if liquidity can flow through the wholesale market 
from the retail markets in slow-growing countries, where it is abundant, to 
where it is scarce, i.e. the retail markets in fast-growing countries, thus 
allowing countries to lie close or on the long-run demand curve (Fig. 2).  
The uniform inflation rate could ideally be reached even if real growth were 
not the same across countries only if the wholesale market were able to 
channel liquidity as above. The assumption of a common monetary equation 
does not necessarily imply that the dual market is able to balance supply and 
demand of liquidity everywhere at the current common interest rate. The 
ECB is interested in making the internal money market as efficient as 
possible not only for the sake of making the transmission mechanism as 
rapid as possible, but also correctly tuned. The ECB itself aims at keeping 
the area-wide inflation just below 2% but it would be optimal if all member 
countries remained constantly at this same mark. In this case, the ECB 
target could be represented by the horizontal line drawn at 2%. While the 
money demand locus in Fig. 2 represents the behaviour of the economy in 
the long-run, the horizontal line indicates the target for the euro zone and for 
its members.  Money market inefficiencies and growth disparities, which are 
likely to increase in the enlarged euro zone, could bring about the observed 
disparities in inflation.  
 
At first glance, although the long-run money demand locus in Fig. 2  
seems to fit well the pattern of average rates in countries such as Austria, 
Germany, Belgium, France and Italy, it leaves some outliers  (Ireland, 
Greece, Luxembourg and Spain) and from this point of view it offers a 




6.  The Balassa-Samuelson approach 
 
According to the New Keynesian theory, inflation can be high because 
high demand interacts with rising costs, accordingly the money demand 
equation inflation can be high because demand is low, with a given money supply. For both theories, high inflation is signalling something wrong in 
the economy – overheating and rigidities in one case, and excess liquidity in 
the other. A third view, however, posits that, to some extent, inflation 
differentials are benign (ECB, 2005).  The idea that inflation is proportional 
to the gap in labour productivity growth of different sectors is also far from 
new. The so–called Balassa-Samuelson theory consists in the proposition 
that in any country inflation is proportional to the gap in the productivity 
growth rates of exportable and non-exportable goods and services, with the 
corollary that if the country is catching up with the technological frontier in 
tradable goods, it will necessarily have a higher inflation rate than 
otherwise. In this case, inflation differentials are benign as they signal a 
technological catching-up or changes in the economic structure. The model 
is particularly simple when exchange rates are constant as in a monetary 
union. By assuming constant income shares and a uniform rate of wage 
increase (w), the resulting school-book equation for the national domestic 
rate reads: 
 
) ( N T T h w p λ λ λ − + − = ,       (7) 
 
where the symbols  T λ and  N λ  indicate the rates of increase in labour 
productivity in the tradable sector and the non-tradable sector respectively, 
and the symbol h is the output share of the non-tradable sector. It is 
immediately clear that any increase in the productivity gap (catching-up in 
the tradable sector) increases inflation, and vice versa, if h is constant. It is 
likely that in fast-growing countries a higher rate of increase  T λ and an even 
higher ratew add something to the overall inflation rate, even if the increase 
in the size of the tradable sector reduces the ,h thus tempering the catching-
up effect itself. The fast growers: Ireland, Luxembourg, Greece and Spain, 
which have just been labelled as outliers – could not, therefore, be 
considered as the villains of the euro zone simply because they lie above the 
ECB target, or out of the money demand locus.  More in general, these 
remarks indicate that the change in the structure and the dynamics in 




7.  Synthesis and conclusions 
 
The annual data regarding real growth and inflation in the euro zone 
from 1997 to 2005 show both similarities – such as the 2001-2003 slump – 
and differences across countries. Annual data basically seem to show (Fig. 
4) a less clear-cut and recurrent New Keynesian pattern of change than what 
emerges on the basis of average rates (Fig. 2). It would be quite accurate to 
characterize the 2001-2003 slump and the subsequent changes in the 
expected inflation rates as a good example of what can shift the supply and 
demand curves in the different countries. As was the case in the simple 
                                                 
15 In a larger euro zone, integration and structural change will be even more important than 
now.   example shown in Fig. 3, an adverse shock and the ensuing change in the 
expected inflation rate force the system to jump from one supply curve to 
the next. This must be taken into consideration when the New Keynesian 
model is used. What is most striking when looking at annual data is the 
existence of countries that float around the cross-over point between the 
money demand line and the ECB target horizontal line. The cases of 
Austria, Belgium, France and Germany (Fig. 4, Panel A) not only is one of 
gravitation towards the ECB target line it is one in which the pattern seems 
to be well interpreted by the money demand equation and also the result of 
shifts of the supply curve in the New Keynesian model
16.  
 
Annual data show that some other countries do not always gravitate 
towards the cross-over or gravitate differently. Finland started well away 
from the demand descending line, but it has since reached it and then 
walked down it (Fig.4, Panel B). Italy hovers just above the target line.  
 
The pattern followed by Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands (Fig. 4, 
Panel C) is also different from the previous ones. Portugal, Spain and the 
Netherlands have floated by more distantly but they have recently shown a 
tendency to converge to the money demand equation.     
 
The case of Portugal and the Netherlands is one of lower stability or, at 
least, a different way of being stable. The true outliers are Luxembourg, 
Greece and Ireland (Fig. 4, Panel D). To them we can add Slovenia as it will 
be in the euro zone as of January 2007. The case of the four countries is not 
the one predicted by the negative-sloped money demand or the ECB target 
line, as supply elements – such as those embedded in the New Keynesian 
theory and the structural model – are slightly more visible in the available 
statistical records.  
 
In conclusion, we stress that inflation disparities can be better analysed 
in conjunction with growth disparities because inflation and growth are 
mutually and strictly dependent phenomena of what we call macroeconomic 
stability. There are different theories. The models do not always give a role 
to the stock of money and offer very different predictions about the 
combined dynamics of real growth and inflation. The annual data for the 
member countries – while showing some convergence towards the pattern 
implicit in the area-wide money demand equation – still do not follow a 
really common pattern. 
                                                 
16 As it is apparent from inspection of the equations in section 4, the New Keynesian model 
does not assign any explicit role to the stock of money.   
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